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11. Public Policy for
Reconnected Citizenship
RICHARD M. VALELLY

public policies influence
the individual and group foundations of democratic processes and insti
tutions. My purpose here is to explore the design of policy for recon
nected democratic citizenship. Reconnected citizenship here means some
shift both at the individual level and among the publics who are involved
in making any given policy work. This shift would be toward a stronger,
more self-conscious approval of some or all of the distinctive norms of
democratic politics (public debate, governmental competence, rule of
law, political equality, and social commitment to social provision of
public goods) and, just as important, the principle that collective prob
lems can be publicly resolved.
By changing or reinforcing links between individuals and group and
electoral politics, policy design can alter the very context of democratic
citizenship in which policy is made. Policy analysts, policymakers, polit
ical activists, and citizens can—and ought—consciously to assess, much
more often than they do now, the potential that any given policy has for
involving citizens in democratically useful forms of group politics and
for strengthening a sense of citizen duty. Policies that do so can enhance
the broad governmental competence (and the public confidence in such
competence) that is a condition for the effective political resolution of
public problems.
Ruy Teixeira, in his study of nonvoting in American politics, calls for
“reconnecting” American citizens to their political system. By this he
means finding ways to foster both a better grasp of political institutions,
processes, and issues among citizens and a significantly more positive,
psychological affect toward the political system. Reconnected citizens, in
his view, differ from citizens who are either indifferent toward or neutral
Intentionally

or unintentionally,

For valuable comments I thank Joshua Cohen, Martha Derthick, and Robert Kuttner.
None, of course, is responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation.
241

242.

RICHARD M. VALELLY

about politics, are openly cynical, or have a weakened sense of citizen
duty, that is, reject a norm of participation whatever their current eval
uation of the political process. Over the past three decades many Amer
icans have developed such attitudes.'
In using the term reconnected citizens, I mean more than citizens
simply having a positive affect toward the political process. Democratic
politics is something that everyone can be part of, at least electorally,
and possibly more often than electorally. Without unrealistically de
manding that everyone be a full-time political agent, my recommenda
tions focus on making political participation more individually meaning
ful for more Americans.

Why Reconnected Citizenship?
Two broad concerns animate these recommendations and the basic
inquiry into the relationship between policy design and democratic citi
zenship. The first has to do with America’s seeming increase in organized
politics bashing (for want of a better term); the second deals with the
fundamental utility and rewards of democratic political community.
First is politics bashing. Fostering reconnected citizenship may consti
tute, I believe, a needed response to increased public discontent with
politics. In 1992, fourteen states approved term limitations for members
of Congress. The idea of an explicit constitutional rule for curbing defi
cits, espoused by Presidents Reagan and Bush, has also become increas
ingly popular, on the ground that ordinary legislative politics has no
internal fiscal balance. Consider, too, some of the Perot movement’s
significance. In launching and then relaunching his candidacy, Ross Perot
and those associated with him frankly espoused new mechanisms of
accountability and representation that would supposedly solve not just
the “mess” in Congress but the whole mess in Washington. These ideas
include electronic town meetings, mass canvassing of the public mood
via instant electronic referenda, and service in the presidency without
pay. The Perot campaign articulated a fairly widespread desire for a
special government above ordinary politics.
Such public discontent undoubtedly performs useful corrective func
tions in American politics. It reflects public concern over very real features
of contemporary American politics and holds open the promises of more
I. Teixeira (1992, chap. 2). The term reconnected can be found on pp. 154—55; fc
reform proposals giving a flavor of Teixeira’s view of reconnectedness, see pp. 156—82.
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collective dialogue and political accountability.^ But collective problems
cannot actually be addressed if there is no public patience with ordinary
democratic government and politics. Politics ought not to be a dirty word
or connote that the dominant reality of American politics is a giant rentseeking scam run by the organized at the expense of the unorganized.
Effective policymaking—the public and efficient provision of public
goods—requires tolerance of the characteristic limits of the policy pro
cess, not a desire for “big fixes,” such as new constitutional rules or
plebiscitary presidencies. Effective policies require feedback, assessment,
and modification when warranted; such feedback, assessment, and re
casting depend on public patience; and public patience ultimately comes
from public loyalty to and confidence in ordinary political and policy
making processes. Policy initiatives in the 1990s, when the public has
become aware of a series of social, environmental, and economic prob
lems, demand a sturdier foundation than impatient discontent.
American politics is now haunted by the specter of inflated expecta
tions and mass disappointments with broad policy initiatives to correct
such widely perceived problems as the health insurance crisis. A subtle
harm to constitutionalism and, ultimately, to political democracy, to say
nothing of the prospects for really solving public problems, might result
from the organized politics bashing that is now a real and growing force.^
Careful attention to how policy can generate reconnected citizenship
may therefore be a way of avoiding such dangers. There are other ways,
of course, such as revitalizing local government. But national policy gets
made regularly; every day large numbers of creative people are thinking
about setting the national policy agenda, shaping the policy process,
influencing implementation, and working to fight future battles over pol
icy. Analyzing how artfully to redirect this ongoing policy process may
help to change the rage, discontent, or simple apathy with and about
government and politics that many Americans feel. Success in doing this,
in turn, might well strengthen the social foundation of public approaches
to common problems.
Public policy for reconnected citizenship has a second and separate
justification. In an important sense, fostering reconnected citizenship
2. Jeffrey Schmalz, “Americans Sign Up In Record Numbers To Cast A Ballot,” New
York Times, October 19, 1992, p. Ai, provides anecdotal evidence of the Perot campaign’s
impact on citizen awareness of issues.
3. See, for instance, President Clinton’s May 14, 1993, press conference. An interesting
report in this connection is Dennis Farney, “Bedroom Communities Want Clinton to Solve
Their Problems, Too,” Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1993, p. Ai.
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would help to lay the “seed corn,” so to speak, of political community
and of the arts and skills of political cooperation and mutual political
association (hereafter referred to as associationalism). These arts and
skills help democratic polities avoid fratricidal conflict, suboptimal social
and economic development, and social tendencies to authoritarianism or
leader worship/
Through its ordinary processes democratic politics often seems to
continually reinvigorate these arts and skills. Recent theorizing about the
relationship between individuals and collective institutions and processes
has come to appreciate that preferences and behavior shift as individuals
cross boundaries between marketlike areas of life and communal and
political areas of life. Voting, for instance, becomes paradoxical and
irrational in strictly egoistic terms, hence the recognition in political
science of the role of a sense of duty. More basically, different domains
exist and people recognize this as they shift back and forth between
them.^
But even if people adjust as they shift between the market and the
public square,” suggesting a stable coexistence of domains, association
alism and the norms supporting it require nurturance, given what is
known about the difficulty of collective action. Self-interest and egoism
are powerful forces; at some point one domain might colonize or conquer
the other. In the 1970s it was widely feared that politics had killed the
market, but the opposite fear—that self-interest more often than not
blocks cooperation for the supply of public goods—is equally plausible.
Self-interest and egoism can and do play positive roles. As an example,
some approaches to environmental regulation recommend establishing
markets in pollutants that would adequately price the negative external
ities of production and thus rapidly accelerate progress toward meeting
environmental standards. But self-interest and egoism, or simple indif
ference toward politics, can gradually corrupt a community’s capacity to
address its problems. In a society as powerfully individualistic as Amer
ican society, it is almost impossible to “overnurture” associationalism
and public-regarding norms.* We may well constantly run, as a society,
4. For a recent statement, see Putnam (1993) generalizing from Putnam, Leonardi, and
Nanetti (1993).
5. See Hirschman (1982) and Kelman (1987, especially chaps. lo-ii). For more ana
lytic treatments, see Margolis (1982), and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). 1 thank Janice
Fine of the MIT Political Science Department for reminding me of the basic links between
the less analytic and more analytic works cited here.
6. This was Tocqueville’s basic point in Democracy in America.
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an associational deficit. Public policy for reconnected citizenship would
help to lay “seed corn” for a stock of socially valuable skills and behav
iors perhaps continually in danger of depletion. Public policy for recon
nected citizenship has not only a short-run justification—balancing the
potential dangers of contemporary politics bashing; it also has a longrun justification—contributing to the diffusion of norms and skills that
any democratic polity needs.

Policy Messages and Citizen Status
My approach to analyzing policy for reconnected citizenship borrows
from the work of other authors in this volume: Helen Ingram and Anne
Schneider’s work on, as they aptly put it, “the subtle messages of policy
design,” Deborah Stone’s account of the role that “causal stories” play
in policy processes, and Janet Weiss’s work on public information cam
paigns.^ Public policies can contain several kinds of messages about pub
lic purposes and citizens’ role in their realization. First, they can send
signals about the people who are involved in making the policy work—
what Ingram and Schneider have called the “target populations” of a
given policy, that is, the specification of “who is to do what, how, and
for what reason.” In selecting target populations, further, a policy and
its design implicitly tell a “story” about both the problem or problems
that the policy is meant to address and the causal role of the target
populations in solving that problem.
For instance, in a case discussed further below, a policy encouraging
European-style works councils within industrial firms would signal that
one of the causes of a public problem, uncertain or possibly declining
industrial competitiveness, is how firms use the problem-solving skills of
their work forces—and therefore would also signal a less well-recognized
problem, namely, poor standards for workplace relations. Therefore, to
realize a common national goal—increased competitiveness—workers
become a “target population” conceived of as agents of a public solution
to the problem of uncertain competitiveness. Their very agency also ad
dresses a related problem—poor standards for workplace relations be
tween workers and management.
This is an illustration of a policy whose design would signal to its
target population the public recognition of a public problem, shared by
many Americans; it thus “constructs” a target population as the agent
7. Chapters 4 and 5 in this volume and Stone (1989).
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of a common purpose, through participation and representation, in local,
workplace problem-solving processes. Not only does such a policy design
help place people in valued problem-solving roles, but it also underscores
that public goals are realizable.
Policy design can thus signal to citizens that effective government is
possible and it involves ordinary people. Key conditions of democratic
political order—competent government and political accountability—are
reinforced. Strengthening these conditions reinforces another democratic
norm—deliberation. Political deliberation, whether in legislatures or in
carpools, means little if government is ineffective or unaccountable. But
deliberation means much more if the prospect of effective government is
genuine. Policy for reconnected citizenship, in other words, involves or
dinary citizens in publicly constituted processes that address real prob
lems and also strengthens their stake in democratic politics.
These points are suggested through illustration. After treating general
issues in democratic theory, a case study of the “employment involve
ment” trend in industrial relations considers how to redirect an existing
trend in a democratically desirable direction. Next a case study of an
environmental policy seeks to uncover the democratic value of an existing
policy. Finally, a case study of legislation to improve voter turnout seeks
to show what a policy proposal already on the legislative agenda may
well need in order to maximize its intended democratic goal. The first
two cases are about designing associationalism; the last treats how to
clarify for citizens some of what is involved in electoral choice.

Recasting Associationalism
One of the key things that public policy for reconnected citizenship
can do is affect the group system. But how easy is citizen involvement in
group politics? And what does democratic theory say about the desira
bility of group politics? Without addressing these questions, seeking to
influence associationalism in the name of reconnected citizenship might
seem either pointless or, worse, factional.

The Relative Ease of Associationalism
Early pluralist theorists, such as David Truman, emphasized how
quickly groups arose, and they underscored the inherently inclusionary
character of the group system, picturing it as an arena for broad repre-
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sentation of a wide variety of interests and values. This view suggests
that associationalism comes easily to citizens. Such a seemingly Panglossian view of the group system came under several kinds of attack, ranging
from Mancur Olson’s formal and logical demonstration of both the dif
ficulty of collective action and the strength of the microeconomic incen
tives to avoid associational activity, to arguments emphasizing the highly
uneven distribution of resources necessary for competition for public
resources within the group system. In E. E. Schattschneider’s famous
phrase, “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings
with a strong upper-class accent.” The cumulative force of these attacks
apparently required very substantial modification of early views of group
politics.*
In recent work, however. Jack Walker went far toward showing that
the group system is as dynamic in its evolution as early pluralists sug
gested, although for reasons far different from those initially emphasized.
Walker constructed the first reliable “census” of interest groups across
time. He found that the older view of “stable unrepresentation” (due to
scarce distribution of political resources) no longer captures interest
group politics.'’ At any point in time in a democratic system political
resources do have a highly skewed, underlying distribution consistent
with the socioeconomic inequalities of a capitalist society. The underlying
scarcity of resources for effective group politics—time, skills, and money
— appears to erect a high “threshold” for associational activity. But
Walker considered the variety and scope of government’s regulatory and
policy initiatives, as well as the array of private institutions and actors,
including government, foundations, and the media, dedicated to solving
policy problems and to diffusing information about policy issues.
Actors in public and private institutions are constantly, if often unin
tentionally, rearranging the group system, for instance, by changing the
structure of opportunities for organization, by providing valuable re
sources, or simply by deepening lines of conflict. For example, when the
Kennedy administration established state-level commissions on the status
of women, it laid the basis for the formation of the National Organization
of Women. Similarly, liberal foundations helped to finance the black
voter registration drive of the early 1960s in the deep South. This accel
erated social change but also intensified factionalism within the civil
rights movement. Injection of resources and change in political oppor8. Truman (1951); Olson (1965); and Schattschneider (1975).
9. Walker (1988); and Gamson (1968).
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tunities thus regularly restructure patterns of collective action. An im
portant aggregate, unintended consequence has been that—with the
exception of the long decline of organized labor—gaps in group repre
sentation have closed steadily since the 1930s. In short, the group system
is dynamic, shifting, and relatively open—not unchanging and closed to
newcomers. While associationalism hardly comes as easily to citizens as
pluralist theorists first claimed, it comes more easily than the reactions
to pluralism suggested.’®

The Relative Desirability of Associationalism
But is a trend toward increased associationalism desirable? If not, why
reinforce it or further stimulate it? From at least two perspectives in
creased associationalism could easily seem questionable. The first is neo
classical liberal theory, which considers the collapse of the separation
between market and state that is embedded in the interventionist, welfare
state a central feature of modern politics. It has generated innumerable
forms of government-conferred privilege for producer and social
groups—farmers, workers, industrial sectors, the aged, and those in need
of low-cost housing. The development of the social standards that are
demanded by these groups simply piles up labor costs, causing capital to
move toward lower-cost countries, and menaces the fiscal balance re
quired for providing truly essential public goods.”
From a more neo-Madisonian political perspective, there is wide
spread evidence of the mischiefs of faction. To whatever degree the group
system is more dynamic than once thought, there still is a threshold of
entry. Groups consequently have an advantage over ordinary citizens in
shaping the political agenda. “Overrepresented” minorities thus generate
governmental goods for their private benefit and spread the costs to the
unorganized majority. “Pork” may be generated, agencies may be “cap
tured,” agenda-setting in specific policy domains may be ceded to orga
nized groups, and, through the political economy of campaign finance,
the integrity of legislators and legislative processes compromised. Groups
may exploit either citizen activism or legitimate citizen concerns while
actually operating as little more than sophisticated, direct mail operations
with high overhead. Or, if they influence presidential nominating rules
10. Walker (1988); see also Walker (1991).
11. For thinking about objections to associationalism 1 found Cohen and Rogers (1991)
very useful.
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of the major parties in their favor, they may undermine the capacities of
parties to offer majoritarian policy platforms.'^
The total results of such rent seeking and faction not only threaten the
norm of equity in access to public privileges and in the incidence of public
burdens (as in the case of spreading the costs of narrow benefits), but
also threaten the foundations of governmental competence (as in the case
of “pork” or agency capture). Yet the prospects both of equity and of
governmental competence are fundamental conditions of a democratic
order. Without them, public debate about public purposes would become
trivial. Thus groups seem constantly to threaten a democratic order.“
But democratic theory does not speak with one voice about groups
and associationalism. It also holds that groups and associations can be
“schools of democracy.” Associationalism builds a certain kind of civic
virtue. As John Stuart Mill argued, participation is educative: a person
has to “weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in the case of conflicting
claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every
turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the
common good.”’"*
A distinction that Tocqueville drew between “self interest well under
stood” and “individualism” is also helpful here. Tocqueville, in Democ
racy in America, pondered the character of the political virtue that de
mocracy requires of its citizens. He suggested that “self interest well
understood” was a form of dem.ocratic virtue strong enough to sustain a
widely held ethic of caring, to some degree, about public concerns. He
contrasted this with an antipolitical attitude, “individualism,” and wor
ried about the disconnection from politics and from the associationalism
of democratic politics that is implied by “individualism.” Associational
ism, in his view, nurtured self-interest well understood.'^
Second, associations can empower and encourage those who can easily
become discouraged and disfranchised: landless farmworkers, the dis
abled and handicapped, veterans of an unpopular war, women discrim
inated against in the workplace and in courtrooms, and ordinary, hard
working blue-collar men and women. Despite formal political equality,
12. An especially striking example of several of these problems can be found in Erik
Eckholm, “Alarmed by Fund Raiser, The Elderly Give Millions,” New York Times, Novem
ber 12, 1992, p. Ai, which describes Richard Viguerie’s activities in direct mail fundraising
for groups supposedly monitoring social security policy for the elderly. See also Hansen
(1991); Hirschman (1970, chap. 6); Moe (1989); and Polsby (1983).
13. McConnell (1966); Hansen (1991); Page (1983); and Romer and Weingast (1991).
14. Pateman (1970, p. 30).
15. Tocqueville (1969, pp. 506-28).
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their “voices,” even if articulated, are often indistinct or inaudible to “the
mainstream.”
Electoral politics, especially presidential electoral politics, would seem
to correct for “deaf democracy.” Voting is not a costly activity: everyone
one can do it, the handicapped and the healthy, men and women, rich
and poor. Also, the presidential constituency is national. Presidents tend
to care about the macroeconomy, national strength, and such broad
issues as strengthening self-reliance, equality, inclusion, and some mea
sure of social justice. Hence the interest in responsible parties and activist
presidencies found among such critics of pluralism as E. E. Schattschneider and Grant McConnell and their legatees in American political science.
And, broadly speaking, as Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen
show, strong party politics, which involves mobilization of the electorate,
tends to reduce class bias in representation.'®
But electoral politics can also be subtly unrepresentative. It tends to
ward the aggregation of interests, toward broadest common denomina
tors. And mandates are notoriously found in the eyes of the beholders.
Electoral outcomes provide very imprecise signals to policymakers; the
information they convey is always mediated by the policy activists, poll
sters, and political professionals within and without major campaign
organizations. The articulation of interests and “voicing” of group poli
tics, particularly protest groups, make up for such intricate exclusion,
removing ambiguity and doubt about interests and needs, and, in so
doing, betokening inclusion and equity. Strong party and electoral poli
tics are perhaps most representative, therefore, when there is also a strong
group system.'^
If, therefore, democratic theory delivers conflicting judgments about
groups and associationalism—finding democratic education and honor
able representation in group politics as much as it finds faction—then
ruling for one or another view obviously becomes an empirical and pru
dential matter. The proof of associationalism is in the political pudding,
as it were. Sometimes democratic education and inclusive representation
ensue; other times, faction prevails. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers have
advised, accordingly, a deliberate politics of association. Using standard
policy tools, they mean to recast group politics so that its processes
converge simultaneously on democratic education, more inclusive rep16. Schattschneider (1975); McConnell (1966); and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993).
17. Schlozman and Verba (1987).
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resentation, and more effective policy. The basic idea here is that groups
have an unrecognized function to perform in tailoring policy initiatives
to local circumstances. In a wide variety of settings they can help ordinary
people to act as the experts “on the ground.” Such policy design can,
indeed, add to governmental competence.'*
To exemplify this recommendation, I will focus on industrial relations
and on an emerging form of representation in environmental regulation.

Recasting Representation in Industrial Relations
By now it is commonplace to hear a summons for public policy to
encourage workplace democracy. Such calls occur in a context in which
it is widely (although hardly universally) assumed that labor has rights,
that is, that industrial democracy, in principle, is socially valuable. But
key issues now are international economic competitiveness, particularly
concerning newly industrializing countries, such as Korea or Taiwan,
and seemingly well organized social systems of production, such as Ja
pan’s or Germany’s, and increasing international wage competition. Thus
calls for employee involvement (or El) typically recognize that, given this
new context, the social standards for protecting a measure of industrial
democracy need to be recast.
Indeed, public policy already seemingly encourages workplace democ
racy and many private initiatives appear to institute it. The tax code
currently encourages employee stock ownership plans; by the late 1980s
several thousand firms, covering millions of employees, had some kind
of employee ownership, and several hundred of these were majorityowned. In addition, several national agencies have responsibilities for
“facilitating the formation of worker cooperatives and worker buy
outs.”^® During much of the 1980s the U.S. Department of Labor assisted
in the creation of more participatory workplace systems.
In the private sector, corporate experimentation with worker partici
pation has been very widespread, partly out of competitive necessity
(also, in part, to shed or to deter unionization). In the 1980s corporate
America was a prime agent of experimentation in new organizational
structures and more flexibility in the workplace. Some form of employee
participation had come to between one-third and one-half of U.S. firms
18. Cohen and Rogers (1991, p. 4x5).
19. The best short discussion, scholarly or popular, is Metzgar (199Z).
20. Bachrach and Botwinick (1992, pp. 104-05). See also Rosen (1991).
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by the mid-1980s. Larger firms may have adopted it more willingly than
smaller firms.^*
The effect of these changes on efficiency is as yet unclear, although the
cumulative evidence regarding the few genuine cases of El suggests real
gains. More relevant to my purpose here, there has been very little dis
cussion of the political consequences.
The effect on citizenship of increased public and private investment in
El appears to have been, at best, slight. Worker-owned and workermanaged companies do tend to reinforce voting in national and local
elections. Workers in such companies also seem a bit more likely to
encourage friends or neighbors to vote, to contact public officials about
an issue, to write letters to editors, to work with others to solve some
community problem, to attend meetings of the city or town council, and
to attend a public hearing of a government agency, such as a school
board.
The meager political effect of the extensive experimentation with El
is surely explained to some extent by its largely cosmetic character. Over
all, the 1980s were marked more by harsher employer treatment of
unions and by less focus on employee job security, pension rights, and
fringe benefits than by consensual establishment of workplace democ
racy. If the experimentation had led to fundamental changes in workplace
hierarchies, then it is much less likely that one would have seen in the
late 1980s and early 1990s both a rash of corporate efforts to replace
striking workers permanently and widespread “downsizing” and “reen
gineering” of work forces. Only a handful of corporations witnessed
signficant efforts at genuine reform: the Saturn division of General Mo
tors, Xerox, Ford Motor Company, and a few others. Others, such as
Eastern Airlines and Caterpillar, saw new management teams disman
tling successful El systems, with, at best, dubious gains.
zi. Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Kochan, and Verman (1991); Heckscher (1991); Kochan and
McKersie (1990); and Bachrach and Botwinick (1992, p. 102).
22. See Greenberg {1986, chap. 5). Greenberg reviews the scant positive, empirical
literature on the subject of workplace democracy’s political effects at pp. 119 and 123.
Greenberg cautions that certain forms of workplace democracy, in particular workerowned cooperatives, tend to make workers, quite rationally, given the market challenges
such co-ops face, more aggressively self-interested.
23. See Kelley and Harrison (1992) and Harrison (1991, p. 74). On the state of labor
relations, see Hoerr (1992). On Xerox, see Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991), the result of doc
toral work at the MIT Sloan School of Management. Saul Rubenstein, of the Sloan Ph.D.
program in industrial relations, is currently preparing a similar study of Saturn. For Ford
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Clearly, therefore, there is room for public policy, in particular policy
that tends to institute the kind of genuine reform that currently exists in
only a few firm-level oases in the American workplace economy. The
Commission for the Future of Worker-Management Relations appointed
by Secretary of Labor Robert Reich suggests that the 1990s may see some
push for revitalized industrial relations.^'* A promising proposal would
tie the reform of pension laws or tax expenditure benefits to establish
ment of employee participation committees (EPCs) in firms larger than
twenty-five employees. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, and
its statutory and administrative amendments, are implicitly seen in this
proposal as somewhat limited, although by no means obsolete. Along
with basic unionism new forms of workplace representation may be
necessary. These would build on recognition of the multiple ways in
which industrial representation has grown up outside the administrative
framework established by the NLRA, for instance, in the federal courts,
which now increasingly govern a variety of workplace issues (for exam
ple, women’s reproductive rights, workplace safety, and pension benefits
of bankrupt companies).
EPC members would be rank-and-file employees elected by their co
workers through secret ballots. EPCs would consider not only wages,
benefits, hiring, and training, but product and process innovation and
the introduction of “best industry practice” technology. Finally, they
would administer federal workplace safety programs in ways that would
eliminate the need for the inspectorates that business has found so med
dlesome.
A key feature of the EPC idea is that it be autonomously funded
through joint worker and firm contributions. In other words, in return
for tax credits or other incentives, firms would be required to partly fund
EPCs. This funding would help EPCs secure expert assistance and advice
from unions, consulting firms, academics, and other EPCs. To the extent
that this incorporation of expertise generated firm-level allocative effiMotor Company, see Neal Templin, “A Decisive Response to Crisis Brought Ford Enhanced
Productivity,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1992, p. Ai. On “re-engineering,” see Al
Ehrbar, “ ‘Re-Engineering’ Gives Firms New Efficiency, Workers the Pink Slip,” Wall Street
Journal, March 16, 1993, p. At. For an equally chilling glimpse at the corporate shedding
of labor, see Joann S. Lublin, “Ranks of Unemployed Couples Multiply, Devastating Dou
ble-Income Flouseholds,” Wall Street Journal, May 7, 1993, p. Bi.
24. For examples of the debate inspired by the commission’s establishment, see Estreicher {1993); Rothstein (1993); and Stone (1993). See also Cohen and Rogers (1992,
pp. 455-58)-
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ciencies, incentives for passing the cost of funding EPCs on to consumers
would diminish.^^
Genuine, robust codetermination, which probably means also helping
autonomous unionism to reemerge in many workplaces, would also have
two political dimensions that firms might accept because of the promise
of internal efficiencies. These are restoring or substantively implementing
protective rights that have not been vigorously enforced in the past dec
ade, such as rights to a safe work environment, and, second, the devel
opment of new participation rights in the form of significant worker
participation in decisions historically considered to be management pre
rogatives.^* Change along these two dimensions would surely be conten
tious. One of the fundamental origins of the Caterpillar strike of 199192, for instance, was management opposition to growing union involve
ment in historic management prerogatives. But workplace democracy
may well possess key economic strengths: flexibility in responding to
market change and higher product quality. It was precisely along these
dimensions that Japanese companies mounted their most effective chal
lenge to firms in other countries in the past two decades.^^ Obviously,
the prospect of reaping efficiencies might well constitute insufficient in
ducement in a corporate culture that has nurtured only superficial
changes in workplace relations and that credits recent success in export
competitiveness to cost cutting through shedding labor or forcing down
the wage bill. But many Americans may be genuinely interested in eco
nomic democracy.^*
EPCs might help to restore confidence among much of the industrial
work force that setting social standards, such as protective rights in the
workplace, is not an exercise in futility. The confidence of industrial
management in broad social standards may be increased, and managers
25. For more on EPCs see Weiler (1990).
26. Bachrach and Botwinick (1992, chap. 9) and Metzgar (199^)27. Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991) details some of the efficiency advantages. Womack,
Jones, and Roos (1990) detail the firm-level characteristics of Japanese industrial compet
itiveness in a leading economic sector, auto-industrial manufacturing.
28. A 1975 survey found that 65 percent would favor working for a company that is
employee owned and controlled; 52 percent would support a plan “in which employees
determine broad company policy”; and 66 percent said they did not work as hard as they
could “because they aren’t given enough say in decisions which affect their jobs.” Christie
(1984, p. 125). The survey is obviously dated, and 1 am not aware of more recent data,
but we now have a better sense that public opinion is surprisingly stable. See Page and
Shapiro (1992, chaps. 1-2). Still, a repeated survey would be required before drawing any
satisfying inference.
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might see that such standards need not be overbroad or burdensome but
can be adjusted to local needs in light of local knowledge and capacities.
A possible second-order effect of reformed workplace relations is the
construction of a certain context for reconnected citizenship. A public
policy encouraging the establishment of EPCs implicitly treats those par
ticipants in EPC formation and maintenance as competent; able to man
age the overlaps between workers’ interests and management interests in
productivity, flexibility, and workplace safety and judge the need for new
rights. It is a policy that tends to “construct” people in a certain way.
In doing this, a policy encouraging workplace democracy that is much
more genuine than has so far appeared with most employee involvement
programs of the 1980s establishes nationally sanctioned patterns of
small-scale governance. Such national encouragement of small-scale
forms of governance might well reinforce citizenship for large-scale gov
ernance. Involvement in making truly consequential decisions at the local
level in a publicly designed and publicly evaluated process may invite
other forms of associationalism beyond the workplace, and it may be
token a strengthened capacity of individuals for involvement in other
processes of consequential decisionmaking. It may promote reconnected
citizenship even as a specific policy issue is addressed in ways that meet
the interests of the various actors in, or concerned about, the policy
domain. A second, similar example follows.

Recasting Representation in
Environmental Regulation
Environmental regulation today explicitly provides for group repre
sentation, such as public comment on rulemaking. Yet such group
representation is subject to the criticism that it impedes effective deci
sionmaking, partly explaining, in turn, a notorious delay in achieving
environmental goals. Putting regulation together with a key feature of
democracy, group representation, seems to be a recipe for the frustration
of public goals and the undermining of governmental competence in this
particular policy area.
One example, however, the 1986 Emergency Planning and Commu
nity Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), seems to provide evidence for a
different and hopeful view of the relationships between groups and reg
ulation. Certain of its characteristics have the potential to improve en
vironmental standards while arguably revitalizing civic consciousness in
local communities around the country.
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In 1986, in response to the disaster at the Union Carbide facility in
Bhopal, India, Congress passed EPCRA as Title III of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, modeling it in part on
an earlier New Jersey right-to-know statute. EPCRA requires the Envi
ronmental Protection Agency to release what is known as the Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI), which lists the quantity of 320 carcinogens
released by industrial plants across the country.^’ The TRI, in principle,
provides information on what a factory is emitting, how much, and into
what medium (land, water, or air) and what chemicals are currently
stored and whether there is a record of spillage.
In fact, TRI is unknown to the general public, even in areas where
general community concern about toxic emissions is known to exist, is
woefully incomplete due both to its flawed, data-gathering mandate and
imperfect corporate compliance, and has few internal, systematic checks
on the reliability of the data it reports. While EPA has made improve
ments to how the information in TRI is released, via on-line database,
CD-ROM, fiche, and other media, obtaining the information is prohibi
tively expensive for an ordinary citizen. Corporations, indeed, purchase
most of the TRI data for their own use. Finally, there is some fragmentary
evidence that TRI encourages corporations in compliance with the EPA
reporting program to juggle their data in order to appear as if they are
reducing emissions at a greater rate than they actually are.
Nevertheless, TRI has spurred citizen protest, involvement by state
environmental regulators, state legislative activity, and very strong vol
untary compliance among leading companies, principally the Monsanto
Corporation, to meet locally set targets for reduction of emissions. Much
of the transmission of its information occurs through the existing system
of environmental advocacy groups. The process is in line with the revised
view of the group system’s developmental dynamics, which states that
associationalism, while not easy, is certainly easier than the critics of
pluralism in the 1960s and 1970s suggested, and that governmental pro
vision of a resource crucial for collective action (in this case, information
that would otherwise be impossible or irrationally time-consuming for
any given group, not to mention the ordinary citizen, to obtain) is a key
stimulus to associationalism.
Environmental advocacy groups computerize and process the dense
information in the TRI, circulating their reformatting of the data, which
29. My treatment of this statute is based on Shenkman (1990); Randolph B. Smith, “A
U.S. Report Spurs Community Action By Revealing Polluters,” Wall Street Journal, January
2, 1991, p. At; and General Accounting Office (1991).
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are then picked up by local media or local activists. Although the evidence
so far is fragmentary, it does seem that this mechanism has triggered the
ad hoc formation of local citizen groups, which then work with local
companies, state regulators, and, when companies are unionized, a
plant’s unions.
Local dynamics are hardly free of conflict, can create tensions, and are
marked by sometimes irate citizen protest. Managers in many companies
evidently believe that the information in the TRI can be and has been put
to misleading uses. But the bottom line seems to be genuine progress, in
several communities, on first developing and then implementing local
environmental standards.
A striking feature of EPCRA’s politics is the policy’s implicit evalua
tion of citizen capacities to understand a scientifically complex issue, in
this case the level of acceptable risk to a community due to toxic emis
sions from a local plant. It assumes that citizens should be able to control
politically the level and kind of toxic emissions occurring in their com
munities. For some, this optimistic evaluation of citizen capacities may
seem mistaken. Scientific literacy is not widespread in the United States,
and it is widely believed among the technologically and scientifically
literate that citizen incompetence probably precludes citizen involvement
in key regulatory issues.
Yet the threshold for effective citizen involvement may not be very
high at all in the sense that ordinary citizens may be able to make rea
sonable choices after only brief exposure to thinking about complex
issues. A recent study paired roughly equal, randomly selected samples
of ordinary citizens and scientists, for whom uncertainty, probability,
and hypothesis are familiar concepts even though they were not experts
in the issues treated by the study. The study exposed the citizen sample
to a questionnaire, a twenty-minute film, and forty-five-minute group
discussions of complex policy issues led by moderators, followed (at a
second, later session) by another brief film recapitulating issues treated
in the earlier session and a readministration of the questionnaire. It found
that for the most part both samples, layman and scientist, considered the
same policy issues similarly. These included solid waste disposal and
reducing the threat of global warming from carbon dioxide emissions
due to coal and gasoline consumption in home heating and transporta
tion. The differences that did exist between the two groups seemed plau
sibly related to factors other than scientific literacy. The study hardly
settles the wisdom or illogic of citizen involvement in scientifically or
technologically complex policy issues. But it does suggest that renewal
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of the system of representation may not have to be restricted to certain
kinds of issues deemed “suitable” for the average citizen.^®
EPCRA’s potential for reconnected citizenship is striking for the ab
sence of an inspectorate intervening in local circumstances. A common
complaint about bureaucracies is that they impose broad standards but
are unable to customize these broad standards, so to speak, to account
for local circumstances. This is not meant to argue against bureaucracies
or standards. The TRI obviously could not exist without bureaucratic
collection of the information that goes into the inventory and efforts to
enforce corporate compliance with reporting. Relatedly, the capacity of
citizen groups in a given locale to have articulate demands at all about
permissible standards clearly depends in part on an earlier, national his
tory of a public search for broad environmental standards. Mentioning
the common complaint about bureaucratic incapacity to take account of
local conditions is meant only to underscore a feature of contemporary
regulation that can and does generate a certain amount of public cyni
cism, both about governmental competence and, more generally, about
the very possibility of effective regulation. EPCRA thus seems to have a
potential for encouraging public confidence in the public purpose of en
vironmental regulation. If so, that points toward reconnected citizenship.
A second and related feature of EPCRA’s politics is the implicit em
phasis on small-scale governance. The design of this policy constructs a
target population in such a way as to endow it with competence to
address responsibly a public problem about which there is widespread
concern, namely, the release of toxic chemicals. The design of the policy
further assumes that a key cause of the problem is public ignorance about
such release and that, therefore, a key remedy must be government pro
vision to citizens of the information they need. Small-scale governance
not only involves people in solving a problem that many actors in the
policy domain, for different reasons, have an interest in solving; it also
has a tendency to lay the “seed corn” of reconnected citizenship. To the
extent that people govern on a small scale, the possibilities grow for the
transfer of skills engendered in one area to another, small-scale context,
or to involvement in electoral politics and in the associational life of
groups or movements with national goals.
In considering how policy design can recast associationalism, I have
stressed that such design has the potential to “construct” citizens as
participants in local forms of representation—in the workplace and in
30. Doble and Richardson {1992).
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communities—that in turn effectively address widely recognized public
problems. But for several reasons a discussion of policy design for recon
nected citizenship must also explore whether and how policy can influ
ence a revitalization of the electoral process.
First, for those who are part of the stronger group politics that is
envisioned here, group politics might well be perceived—by some frac
tion of them—as oriented toward broad goals if electoral politics is also
seen as meaningful and valuable. Second, some fraction of those who are
not now involved in group politics may become more interested if elec
toral politics is perceived as more vital. The two domains, group and
electoral, may renew each other. Associationalism ought to be seen as a
continuum, and policy for reconnected citizenship ought—and can—
attend to reconnecting all along this continuum.

Recasting Voter Registration:
The Role of Public Information
As is well known, voter turnout in U.S. presidential elections (defined
as the ratio of actual to eligible voters) dropped about 13 points between
i960 and 1988, and it dropped in other national elections as well. To be
sure, the 1992 presidential election seems to have reversed the trend
noticeably, but given the amount of measurement error in estimates pro
duced on or right after election day, and given the weight and variety of
social and political forces that appear to have produced the decline, it
will not be clear whether there really was a significant reversal until well
into 1993, and, in any event, far from clear that it can stand as a lasting
reversal.^’
Nonvoting, indeed, is pervasive in American electoral politics. Minor
ities of active voters determine the outcomes of gubernatorial, state leg
islative, county, mayoral, and municipal council elections, as well as state
and local referenda. While there are exceptions, the rule seems to be that
the smaller the constituency, the smaller the active voting public.^^
The question of whether and how to reverse decline in just one cate
gory of electoral activity, national elections, proves to be a genuinely
complex matter. Any resolution of it depends in part on properly con
ceptualizing the decline and on properly specifying its causes. Neither
facet of the issue is (nor is likely to become) free of enduring controversy.
31. For a brief introduction, see Valelly (1990).
32. The theoretical framework for this proposition is laid out in Peterson (1981).

z6o

RICHARD M. VALELLY

Even more controversial are evaluations of whether turnout decline
makes or has made any real difference for the representation of public
policy preferences, and thus for who gets what from government.
Even if one concludes that turnout decline can partly be reversed
through choices that are plausible and possible in the contemporary
political context, it turns out that simply returning to the status quo as
of about i960 will probably require at a minimum an ambitious mix of
strategies: reform of campaign finance, reform of print and broadcast
media coverage of the electoral process, and changes in procedures for
voter registration. Even so, historically deep-seated features of how par
ties compete with each other and how they mobilize (and fail vigorously
to mobilize) voters would inhibit the full potential effect of this mix of
reforms.
Still, agency-based registration (the “motor voter” bill), a key accom
plishment of the 103d Congress, is an important step. Voters register to
vote when they are also interacting with a state agency, such as a motor
vehicle registration board. Under this reform states are also provided
with resources for using an unbiased procedure for regularly cleaning
their voter lists. Agency-based registration lowers the costs of voter reg
istration to an individual radically by “folding” them—as Teixeira has
pointed out—into another set of costs, like those of, say, registering a
car. The potential effect on turnout is estimated between 4 and 10 per
centage points.^'*
Little attention seems to have been paid, though, to the need to alert
citizens—as they interact with an agency—as to why motor voter regis
tration seems easier. There is a role here for a public information cam
paign. Such a campaign could reinforce the norm of citizen duty that
seems clearly important in motivating a decision to vote at all.
A narrow microeconomic approach to voting would lead any voter to
conclude that the ratio of costs of voting—time involved in registering
and voting, for instance—far outweigh the real benefit to the individual
of voting. The decision to vote depends, in other words, on political
norms. And, having decided to vote, an average voter is unlikely to vote
on narrow pocketbook grounds. Such voting is less frequent than voting
based on broad retrospective or prospective evaluations of the perfor
mance of politicians (“have they, or has he or she, made America or the
state or the district better or worse off?”). Yet the role of political norms
33. McGerr (1986); Rosenstone and Hansen (1993); and Coleman (1992).
34. Teixeira (1992, chap. 4).
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in the decision to vote—and perhaps in the act of voting—has become
attenuated. Policy design can play a key role in replenishing the force of
norms in voting; it can lay the “seed corn” of associationalism in its
broadest sense.^^
The National Election Study used to ask survey questions that sought
to tap citizens’ sense of obligation to participate in spite of factors that
made it seem hard or unpleasant. Because so little change seemed to
occur, most of the survey items were dropped after 1980, but the one
that was retained—whether one ought to vote even if one did not care
much about an election—showed a very substantial drop of 17 points
(59 to 4z) between 1980 and 1988. The Washington Post has asked
citizens whether they thought that their vote mattered. In 1980 its survey
found that 91 percent responded yes, but by 1991 that number dropped
to only 73 percent.^*
Under these circumstances, agency-based voter registration may not
play as effective a role as it could without an effort to address the decline
in a sense of citizen duty. When citizens register to vote while doing
something else at an agency, they can be provided with a brief analysis
of what many political scientists refer to as the “turnout problem.”
Providing information will cause controversy, and formulating its con
tent may (perhaps ought) to require a special federal commission that
incorporates the advice and input of the fifty secretaries of state, as well
as expert advice on what is known about the consequences and effec
tiveness of public information campaigns. This is a policy tool whose use
inevitably raises broad questions about how to safeguard against govern
ment manipulation of citizens.
But an information campaign might include coverage of the change in
turnout since i960, a brief international comparison of turnout in the
United States and in other countries (a feature that will inevitably arouse
concern since turnout is much lower in the United States than elsewhere)
and further analysis showing, though, that the United States differs much
less from other countries in rate of turnout among registered voters. A
public information campaign would emphasize the clear evidence that
once registered, voters tend to vote. Fourth, it could also emphasize what
35. This proposal seems consistent with Teixeira’s own sense of the unexplored role of
information in changing citizen motivation: “Though it may be implausible to expect a
characteristic like party identification (partisanship) to increase much in intensity ... it is
quite plausible ... to expect levels of information-oriented characteristics to increase . . .”
(1992, pp. 156-57).
36. Teixeira (1992, pp. 55—56).
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political scientists have tended to find, namely, that turnout does not
benefit one party or the other. Fifth, an information campaign could
summarize the arguments that hold that the “turnout problem” is exag
gerated. Finally, it could suggest further reading, pro, con, or mainly
informative, and a brief statement of a key rationale for voting, namely,
that active voters tend to know more about what their government is
doing than inactive voters or habitual nonvoters.
Thus the design of agency-based voter registration could be altered so
that it incorporates a particular policy tool, the public information cam
paign, so as to reinforce or reawaken a sense of citizen duty, as defined
above. Janet Weiss reports that public information campaigns appealing
to existing, widely held norms are the most successful.^^ This may be
because an individual’s awareness of the relatively uncontroversial nature
of these norms makes it easier for him or her to pass along or to discuss
with others—family members, coworkers, and friends—the contents of
a public information campaign. Agency-based registration thus has a
potential for more fully replenishing—without manipulation and in a
way that is respectful of citizens—the norms that motivate voting.
Otherwise, agency-based registration may subtly signal to citizens that
citizenship is mainly a matter of calculating costs and benefits (“If we
lower the costs to you won’t you please vote?”). If so, this would hardly
be a way to lay “seed corn” for strengthening democratic politics.
Through espousing a sensitivity to how policy design affects citizenship,
one sees that a simple issue of apparent detail—whether to provide in
formation about the “turnout problem”—raises the question of how to
maximize the broad, democratic utility of a public policy.

Conclusion
Policies are often evaluated as to whether they get the job done well
and at what price. But policies and their design can also alter the very
democratic context within which policymaking and policy evaluation
take place. Like others in this volume I have argued here for an approach
to policy analysis that is more sensitive to consciously strengthening
democracy than most contemporary policy analysis. Through illustration
I sought to show that policy analysts and policymakers alike can ask
important questions about and of policy trends and initiatives. Other
examples would surely occur to a group of legislators or administrators.
37. Chapter 5 in this volume.
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How can an existing trend be redirected in a normatively desirable di
rection? The discussion of building on the employee involvement move
ment of the 1980s by encouraging works councils sought to answer this
question. Does this or that policy have an unappreciated democratic
value? The discussion of the surprising effect on group representation in
environmental regulation of the Emergency Community Planning and
Right-to-Know Act addressed this question. What does a policy proposal
already on the legislative agenda seem to need in order to meet its in
tended goal? By exploring the role of a public information campaign in
agency-based voter registration policy, I sought to answer this question.
Concerns about strengthening both the meaning of democratic citizen
ship and the continuum of associational life that stretches between simply
deciding to vote and fairly engaged participation in a citizen’s movement
or in a group stood behind these questions. Thinking through how to lay
the “seed corn” of associational norms and political skills can inform,
indeed articulate, policy analysis and recommendation. Policy design can
construct citizens as competent to address public problems. It can do so
by providing for representation in local problem-solving processes. Such
representation provides for small-scale governance that, in turn, can fos
ter reconnected citizenship in other areas: other groups and more fre
quent voting. The problem-solving features of local representation that
can be encouraged by policy also reinforce a norm of governmental
competence. Public confidence in the realizability of such a norm is cru
cial to democracy and its deliberative character. Otherwise, public cyni
cism can steadily grow. Finally, public policy can reinforce existing norms
that are crucial for reconnected citizenship, such as the sense of citizen
duty that can motivate electoral participation.
Even if policy design can in fact attend to the task of laying “seed
corn,” ought it to? Tocqueville claimed that knowledge of association is,
as he put it, the “mother of all other forms of knowledge,” a dictum
implying that strong, mutually respectful, “bottom-up” patterns of dem
ocratic participation and associationalism help nations to become more
prosperous and decent.^* His claim for a correlation between such forms
of participation and national strength makes sense, in fact, out of the
cases explored here. Real, not ersatz, employee involvement arguably
makes firms stronger and more competitive, and to the extent that firms
are stronger, then sectors and the economy as a whole are stronger.
Participation may well be crucial, also, to environmental problem solv38. Tocqueville (1969, p. 517).
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ing. Finally, while the link is less obvious in the case of strengthening the
norms that motivate voting, stronger links between citizens and the elec
toral process are crucial for creating basic public respect for political
approaches to common problems.
Democratic renewal through public policy and other initiatives is, in
fact, already on our national agenda. The American polity is in the midst
of a widespread sense of public discontent with politics unrivaled since
the late nineteenth century. Democratic systems have many internal
sources of renewal, not least the constant recognition among citizens that
the norms governing the “market” areas of daily life differ from the
norms that are sovereign in the “public square.” But the careful design
of public policy is not often seen as a strategy of renewal. This chapter—
this volume—urges us to take public policy for democracy more seri
ously.
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